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Abstract 
  
When dealing with market risk under the Basel II Accord, variation pays in the form of lower 
capital requirements and higher profits. Typically, GARCH type models are chosen to 
forecast Value-at-Risk (VaR) using a single risk model. In this paper we illustrate two useful 
variations to the standard mechanism for choosing forecasts, namely: (i) combining different 
forecast models for each period, such as a daily model that forecasts the supremum or infinum 
value for the VaR; (ii) alternatively, select a single model to forecast VaR, and then modify 
the daily forecast, depending on the recent history of violations under the Basel II Accord. We 
illustrate these points using the Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite Index. In many cases we 
find significant decreases in the capital requirements, while incurring a number of violations 
that stays within the Basel II Accord limits. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
A financial crisis occurs when there is a significant fall in stock prices and a marked increase 
in the uncertainty about the value of financial assets. A crisis may also be accompanied by 
panic, which can be contagious. During a financial crisis, the risks associated with investing 
increase substantially. The financial crisis of 2008-09 has left an indelible mark on economic 
and financial structures worldwide, and left an entire generation of investors wondering how 
things could have become so bad. Many questions have been asked about whether appropriate 
regulations were in place, especially in the USA, to permit the appropriate monitoring and 
encouragement of (possibly excessive) risk taking. 
  
The Basel II Accord (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996)) was designed to 
monitor and encourage sensible risk taking by using appropriate models of risk to calculate 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) and subsequent daily capital charges. However, the Basel II Accord does 
not apply to the USA. 
  
VaR is defined as an estimate of the potential loss to be expected over a given period, and is a 
standard tool in financial risk management. It has become especially important following the 
1995 amendment to the Basel Accord, whereby banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking 
Institutions (ADIs) were permitted (and encouraged) to use internal models to forecast daily 
VaR (see Jorion (2000) for a detailed discussion). The last decade has witnessed a growing 
academic and professional literature comparing alternative modelling approaches to determine 
how to measure VaR, especially for large portfolios of financial assets. 
  
The amendment to the initial Basel Accord was designed to encourage and reward institutions 
with superior risk management systems. A back-testing procedure, whereby actual returns are 
compared with the corresponding VaR forecasts, was introduced to assess the quality of the 
internal models used by ADIs. In cases where internal models lead to a greater number of 
violations than could reasonably be expected, given the confidence level, the ADI is required 
to hold a higher level of capital (see Table 1 for the penalties imposed under the Basel II 
Accord). Penalties imposed on ADIs affect profitability directly through higher capital 
charges, and indirectly through the imposition of a more stringent external model to forecast 
VaR. This is one reason why financial managers may prefer risk management strategies that 
are passive and conservative rather than active and aggressive. 
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Excessive conservatism can have a negative impact on the profitability of ADIs, as higher 
daily capital charges are subsequently required. Therefore, ADIs should perhaps consider a 
strategy that allows an endogenous decision as to how many times ADIs should violate in any 
financial year (for further details, see McAleer and da Veiga (2008a, 2008b), McAleer (2008), 
Caporin and McAleer (2009), and McAleer et al. (2009a)). This paper suggests alternative 
aggressive and conservative risk management strategies that can be compared with the use of 
one or more models of risk throughout the estimation and forecasting periods. We also 
discuss the strategy of choosing one risk model at the beginning of the period, and 
subsequently modifying the forecast depending on the recent history of violations of the 
model (see McAleer et al. (2009b)). 
  
In this paper we define risk management in terms of choosing sensibly from a variety of risk 
models. We discuss the selection of optimal risk models by considering a combination of  
alternative risk models, and modifying the forecasts of a given risk model depending on the 
recent history of violations of the model. We evaluate the effects of the Basel II Accord on 
risk management, and how risk management strategies performed during the 2008-09 
financial crisis. 
  
These issues are illustrated using Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite Index, with an 
emphasis on how risk management practices were encouraged by the Basel II Accord 
regulations during the financial crisis. 
 
2. The fast recession of 2008-09 in perspective.   
 
The recession of 2008-09 is undoubtedly severe, but not as much as the Great Depression. 
During the Great Depression of 1928-1934, Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite1 Index 
                                                 
1 Some changes in the definition of the S&P500 index over time:  
• 1923 -- Standard de Poor's develops its first stock market indicators. The new stock indices cover 26 
industry groups and 233 companies. Also, S&P introduces base-weighted aggregate technique to gauge 
stock market performance.  
• 1926 -- Standard & Poor's creates a 90 Stock Composite Price Index, comprising 50 Industrials, 20 
Rails and 20 Utilities. The new composite has a base period of 1926=100 and is calculated and 
published weekly. Historical values are available going back to 1918. The "233" and the industry group 
indices are re-based to 1926=100 and are calculated and published weekly.  
• 1928 -- Standard & Poor's 90 Stock Composite Price Index is calculated and published daily.  
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(S&P500) and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), using daily data for the period 
3/1/1928-1/7/2009, fell by 86.18% and 89.19%, from a peak of 6/9/1929 to a trough of 
1/6/1932, and a peak of 3/9/1929 to a trough of 8/7/1932, respectively, whereas the 
comparable figures for 2008-09 for S&P 500 and DJIA were falls of 53.25% and 49.86% 
from a peak of 3/1/2008 to a trough of 9/3/2009, and from a peak of 2/5/2008 to a trough of 
9/3/2009, respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Daily levels of the DJIA and S&P500. 
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The average daily falls in returns of S&P500 and DJIA were 0.23% and 0.25% during the 
Great Depression, from a peak of 6/9/1929 to a trough of 1/6/1932, and from a peak of 
3/9/1929 to a trough of 8/7/1932, respectively, while the average daily falls in returns of 
S&P500 and DJIA were 0.25% and 0.32% in 2008-09, from a peak of 3/1/2008 to a trough of 
                                                                                                                                                        
• 1941 -- The "233" grows to 416, comprising 72 industry sub-groups. The new "416" and the 90 Stock 
Composite are re-based to 1935-39=100  
• 1957 -- The "416" becomes the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Stock Price Index. Thanks to 
technological advancements, computers are introduced and permit the "500" to be calculated and 
disseminated at one-minute intervals throughout the trading day. In order to create a lengthy historical 
time series, the new "500" is linked to the 90 Stock Composite Price Index-daily S&P500 Index prices 
become available back to 1928. The original "233" and "90" stock indices have evolved into the modern 
"500". The "500" now consists of 425 Industrials, 60 Utilities and 15 Rails, and has a base period of 
1941-43=10.  
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9/3/2009, and from a peak of 2/5/2008 to a trough of 9/3/2009, respectively, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Daily Returns of the DJIA and S&P500. 
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The standard deviation of S&P500 and DJIA returns reached 15% and 14 % during the Great 
Depression, respectively, while in 2008-09 both indexes reached only 11 %, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. 2 
                                                 
2 On 19 October 1987 (Black Monday) stock markets crashed and fell a huge value in a very short time. 
As shown in Figure 1, the S&P500 and the DJIA fell by 23% and 26% just in one day, respectively. The 
standard deviation of both S&P500 and DJIA returns reached 25.5%. The Black Monday decline was 
the largest one-day percentage decline in stock market history. 
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Figure 3. Standard Deviation of Daily Returns of the DJIA and S&P500. 
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A caveat is that the Great Depression lasted for 6 years while the current depression has been 
in place for less than a year and may not be over yet (as of July 2009).  The 2008-09 
depression is less pronounced but somewhat faster than the Great Depression.   
 
The DJIA and S&P500 indexes are very highly correlated with each other, as seen in Table 1, 
and tell a similar story in levels, returns and volatility. The use of either is likely to be 
sufficient for analysing the issues at hand. 
 
Table 1. Correlations between DJIA and S&P500 
 
CORRELATIONS DAILY 
  
Index (level) 0.996068 
Return 0.940417 
Standard Deviation 0.999212 
 
As we have seen, the indexes fell by around 90% during the Great Depression, while they 
decreased by around 54% during the 2008-09 crisis. Volatility reached 15% during the Great 
Depression while it reached 11% during the 2008-09 crisis. The Great Depression was around 
5 times deeper in terms of prices and 36% bigger in terms of volatility.  
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Once we have placed the 2008-09 crisis into greater perspective, we will be able to discuss 
how market risk has been managed during the 2008-09 crisis under the Basel II Accord. 
 
3. Risk management during the 2008-09 financial crisis under the Basel II Accord.   
 
When ADIs manage risk within the framework of the Basel II Accord, they can choose a 
model of risk for predicting their VaR. Then they have to communicate their forecasts on a 
daily basis to the relevant monetary authority. 
 
The ADIs usually choose ARCH-type models (such as GARCH, GJR, EGARCH, and 
EWMA) that relate future risk to current and past risk (for a discussion of these and other 
models, see McAleer et al, (2009b)). 
 
The Basel II Accord stipulates that daily capital charges (DCC) must be set at the higher of 
the previous day’s VaR or the average VaR over the last 60 business days, multiplied by a 
factor (3+k) for a violation penalty, wherein a violation involves the actual negative returns 
exceeding the VaR forecast negative returns for a given day: 
  
 ( ){ }______60 1sup 3 VaR ,   VaRt tDCC k −= − + −  (1) 
 
where  
 
DCC = daily capital charges, which is the higher of ( ) 160______ VaR  and VaR3 −−+− tk , 
 
tVaR  = Value-at-Risk for day t, 
 
ˆ ˆt t t tVaR Y z σ= − ⋅ , 
 
60
______
VaR  = mean VaR over the previous 60 working days, 
 
tYˆ = estimated return at time t, 
 
tz = 1% critical value of the distribution of returns at time t,  
 
tσˆ = estimated risk (or square root of volatility) at time t, 
 
10 ≤≤ k   is the Basel II violation penalty (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Basel II Accord Penalty Zones 
 
Zone Number of Violations k 
Green 0 to 4 0.00 
Yellow 5 0.40 
 6 0.50 
 7 0.65 
 8 0.75 
 9 0.85 
Red 10+ 1.00 
 
Note: The number of violations is given for 250 business days. 
The penalty structure under the Basel II Accord is specified for 
the number of violations and not their magnitude, either 
individually or cumulatively.   
 
The multiplication factor (or penalty), k, depends on the central authority’s assessment of the 
ADI’s risk management practices and the results of a simple back test. It is determined by the 
number of times actual losses exceed a particular day’s VaR forecast (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (1996)). The minimum multiplication factor of 3 is intended to 
compensate for various errors that can arise in model implementation, such as simplifying 
assumptions, analytical approximations, small sample biases and numerical errors that tend to 
reduce the true risk coverage of the model (see Stahl (1997)). Increases in the multiplication 
factor are designed to increase the confidence level that is implied by the observed number of 
exceptions to the 99 per cent confidence level, as required by the regulators (for a detailed 
discussion of VaR, as well as exogenous and endogenous violations, see McAleer (2008), 
Jiménez-Martin et al. (2009), and McAleer et al. (2009b)). 
 
This backtesting procedure intends to encourage appropriate risk management by ADIs, while 
ensuring their liquidity and solvency. In the next section we discuss strategies that can be 
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adopted by the ADIs to enhance risk management practices by minimizing their daily capital 
charges while restricting the number of violations to lie within the Basel II Accord limits. 
 
4. Proposals for sophisticating the forecasts of VaR to minimize DCC within Basel II.  
 
In this section, the forecast values of VaR for different forecast models and daily capital 
charges are analysed before and during the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
 
In Figure 4, VaR forecasts are compared with S&P500 returns for the period 2 January, 2008 
through to 2 July 2009. The vertical axis represents returns, while the horizontal axis 
represents time. Returns of S&P500 are given as the upper blue line that fluctuates around 
zero. The upper red line represents the infinum of the VaR calculated for individual models of 
volatility (VAR upperbound), which reflects an aggressive risk management strategy, whereas 
the lower green line represents the supremum of the VaR calculated for the individual models 
of volatility (VAR lowerbound), which reflects a conservative risk management strategy. 
These two lines correspond to a combination of alternative risk models (see McAleer et al. 
(2009b) for further details).  
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Figure 4. VaR for S&P500 Returns, 2 January, 2008 –2 July, 2009 
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As can be seen in Figure 4, VaR forecasts obtained from the different models of volatility 
have fluctuated, as expected, during the first few months of 2008. It has been relatively low, 
at below 5%, and relatively stable between April and August 2008.  Around September 2008, 
VaR started increasing until it peaked in October 2008, between 10% and 15%, depending on 
the model of volatility considered. This is essentially a five-fold increase in VaR in a matter 
of two months.  In the last two months of 2008, VaR decreased to between 5% and 8%, which 
is still twice as large as it was just a few months earlier. It has continued decreasing in the first 
6 months of 2009, towards values similar to those immediately before September 2008. 
  
In McAleer et al. (2009b), we developed a risk management strategy that used combinations 
of several models for forecasting VaR. It was found that an aggressive risk management 
strategy (namely, by choosing the infinum of VaR forecasts – upperbound) yielded the lowest 
mean capital charges, and had the highest frequency of minimizing daily capital charges 
throughout the forecasting period, but which also tended to violate too often. On the other 
hand, a conservative risk management strategy (namely, by choosing the supremum –
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lowerbound) had far fewer violations, and correspondingly higher mean daily capital charges. 
This can be seen in Table 3 below, taken from McAleer et al. (2009b). 
 
Table 3. Percentage of Days Minimizing Daily Capital Charges, 
Mean Daily Capital Charges, and Number of Violations for 
Alternative Models of Volatility 
 
 
Model 
% of Days 
Minimizing 
Daily Capital 
Charges 
Mean Daily 
Capital 
Charges 
Number of 
Violations 
Riskmetrics 14.0 % 0.163 10 
GARCH 0.0 % 0.161 13 
GJR 10.0 % 0.157 7 
EGARCH 1.70 % 0.146 13 
GARCH_t 0.00 % 0.171 3 
GJR_t 0.00 % 0.167 3 
EGARCH_t 34.0 % 0.153 3 
Lowerbound 0.00 % 0.177 3 
Upperbound 39.6 % 0.143 16 
 
Note: the models of volatility chosen are the most frequently used in this literature. The figures are for the 
S&P500 index from 2 January 2008 to 12 February 2009. 
 
The area between the bounds provided by the aggressive and conservative risk management 
strategies would seem to be a fertile area for future research. 
  
We could also compare the previous strategies with a dynamically learning strategy, DYLES, 
developed in McAleer et al. (2009a). For that strategy we disclose a market risk (MRD) that is 
the one given by a risk model that was modified by a weight factor Pt : 
 
=t t tMRD P VaR  
where Pt varies with the number of violations, to communicate risk to the monetary 
authorities. The variable Pt is a measure of how conservative or aggressive the MRD is in 
comparison with the estimated risk: Pt < 1 corresponds to an aggressive strategy because the 
MRD is below the estimated risk, whereas Pt >1 represents a conservative strategy (see 
McAleer et al. (2009b) for further details). 
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The DYLES strategy leads to capital requirements that are significantly lower than those of 
competing models that stay within the Basel II limits. In particular, for a period of one year, 
when DYLES is used, it can improve on EGARCH t, which, as seen in Table 3, is one of the 
leading competitors, decreasing the average credit requirement by up to 96 basis points. See 
McAleer et al. (2009a). 
 
The Basel II Accord is currently under scrutiny, with the purpose of enhancing its 
effectiveness for multinational financial regulation, as can be seen in the Consultative 
Document of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009). The Document contains 
proposals for changes to Pillars 1 to 3, namely minimum capital requirements, supervisory 
review process and market discipline. 
  
The Document discusses the application of more stringent risk weights, the management of 
liquidity risks and of solvency risks, and the use of stress tests (pages 2, 23 and 25), among 
other proposed regulatory measures. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we analysed the construction of risk management strategies that used 
combinations of several models for forecasting VaR. It was found that an aggressive risk 
management strategy yielded the lowest mean capital charges, and had the highest frequency 
of minimizing daily capital charges throughout the forecasting period, but which also tended 
to violate too often. On the other hand, a conservative risk management strategy would yield 
far fewer violations, and correspondingly higher mean daily capital charge. 
  
We also compared the previous two strategies with the DYLES strategy of McAleer et al. 
(2009a). In this case, we found slightly higher mean capital charges than the aggressive 
strategy, while the number of violations remained within the Basel II Accord limits.   
  
The analysis presented above strongly suggests that, in seeking to manage market risk 
optimally, it can pay to vary risk management models on a daily basis. 
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